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No. 60
Sen. John McCain of Arizona and other advo-
cates of additional regulations on campaign
finance argue that spending on elections has
caused public cynicism about and mistrust of
American government. They also believe that
public opinion indicates that Congress should
move immediately to pass new campaign
finance regulations. This paper uses public
opinion data to test both claims. 
McCain and his allies are wrong on both
counts. The data show that campaign spending
could not have caused increases in public mis-
trust of government—indeed, rising soft money
spending has been followed by increases (not
decreases) in public trust in government—and
that there is no statistical relationship over time
between campaign spending and public trust in
American government. The data also show that
the public assigns a low priority to altering cam-
paign finance regulations.
Both findings militate against the current
attempt in Congress to pass the McCain-
Feingold regulations on campaign fundraising.
New regulations on campaign finance will not
increase public trust in government because
campaign spending did not cause public cyni-
cism. Moreover, contrary to Senator McCain’s
opinion, the low priority given campaign
finance regulations by the public suggests that
the McCain-Feingold bill should be dealt with
much later in the 107th Congress, after more
pressing issues have been addressed.
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Introduction
In the 2000 race for the presidency, Sen.
John McCain (R-Ariz.) promoted campaign
finance “reform” as a partial solution to
widespread citizen cynicism about politics.
Al Gore promised that his first act as presi-
dent would be to send campaign finance leg-
islation to Congress. The mass media, which
cover campaign finance feverishly and
assume that money is the root of all political
evils, report on new regulations with little of
their usual skepticism. The appeal of such
proposals is easy to understand. In an era of
public cynicism about politics, new regula-
tions promise new ways of doing business in
Washington.
Campaign finance is now front and center
on the congressional agenda. Sens. McCain
and Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) will reintro-
duce their eponymous legislation in the
107th Congress.1 They propose eliminating
“party soft money,” or contributions to
national political parties that must be used
for “party-building” activities like getting out
the vote. The bill also promises to bring
“issue advocacy” under federal campaign
finance laws.2 McCain has been quoted as
saying that there will be “blood on the Senate
floor” if the bill does not pass.3
McCain believes the public supports his
efforts to pass new campaign finance laws: “I
believe that the country wants this reform.
There is no doubt about the explosion of soft
money. There is no doubt that it has gridlocked
us here in Washington and the message of the
last election is that Americans do not want
that.”4 In announcing his plans to introduce
the legislation, McCain also noted that pollster
John Zogby had briefed Republican senators
about the broad public support for new regula-
tions on campaign finance.5
Public opinion figures in the campaign
finance debate in another way. Advocates of
new regulations on fundraising argue that
the unregulated aspects of the current sys-
tem (soft money, issue advocacy) foster pub-
lic cynicism about and mistrust of American
government. Americans do lack confidence
in Congress and the presidency specifically
and in the federal government in general.6 If
the advocates were right, new restrictions on
campaign finance might counteract this gen-
eral trend in public opinion toward a mis-
trust of American government and public
officials.
I contend that the advocates are wrong on
both counts. Specifically I argue that 
• there is a weak link between the decreased
trust in government and campaign spend-
ing and that
• the public favors change in campaign
finance laws but ranks it as an extremely
low policy priority. 
Trust in Government and
Campaign Spending
Do campaign contributions corrupt legis-
lators and “buy” elections? Discerning a clear
relationship between campaign contribu-
tions and policy outcomes is an imposing
task. There is conflicting statistical evidence
regarding the effect of spending on cam-
paign outcomes, and the evidence for a
cause-and-effect relationship between dona-
tions and policy outcomes is muddled.7
Nonetheless, most advocates of reform
intimate that quid pro quo corruption is the
norm but stop short of directly making that
claim. Others such as Senator Feingold do
assert that “money talks” and refer to cam-
paign contributions as “legalized bribery.” In
general, advocates of more regulation sug-
gest that even the appearance of impropriety is
enough to warrant additional regulation,
since citizen distrust of government is con-
nected to the belief that politicians are cor-
rupt.8 Consider Senator McCain’s statement
introducing his bill in 1998: 
Mr. President, no Washington
pundit thought that the House
would actually pass campaign
finance reform, but it did. It was not
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an easy fight. But those in favor of
reform prevailed. I hope the majority
in the Senate that favors reform will
be able to prevail here. A majority in
the House passed reform because the
American people demand it. Members
of the House recognized that the cur-
rent system is awash in money,
exploited loopholes, and publicly
perceived corruption. It is a system
that no Member of Congress should
take pride in defending.
As I mentioned, Mr. President, yes-
terday was primary day in Arizona.
Turnout was an all-time low, indicat-
ing another record-setting low
turnout election day. I have no doubt
whatsoever that the way in which we
finance our campaigns has in no small
measure contributed to the abysmal health
of our democracy. The people’s con-
tempt—there is no more charitable
way to describe it—for us and for the
way in which we attain our privileged
place in government cannot be sus-
tained perpetually. We will someday
pay a high price for our inattention to
this problem. We will forfeit our abili-
ty to lead the country as we meet the
complicated challenges confronting
us at the end of this century because
we have so badly squandered the pub-
lic respect necessary to persuade the
Nation to take the often difficult
actions that are required to defend
the Nation’s interests.
Our ability to lead depends solely
on the public’s trust in us. Mr.
President, people do not trust us today.
And that breach, that calamity, is what the
supporters of campaign finance reform
intend to repair. I beg all of my col-
leagues to join in this effort and give
our constituents a reason to again
trust us, and to take pride in the insti-
tution we are so proud to serve.9
McCain is not the only senator to make
unsupported claims. On the campaign
finance section of his Web site, Sen. Fred
Thompson (R-Tenn.) writes: “Americans have
less and less faith in their government. One
of the main reasons is that they are distrust-
ful of the system we have in place to elect our
political leaders.”10 On Meet the Press on
January 7, 2001, Thompson reiterated the
importance of getting campaign finance leg-
islation on the agenda, because it could help
restore confidence in the system:
I think that President-elect Bush will
work with McCain and others of us
who think we ought to do some-
thing in this regard, that big money
has gotten out of control and played
too much of a role in American poli-
tics. . . . [F]or the first time, we have
an opportunity of coming up with
something that I think is good and
will help restore a little bit of confi-
dence of the American people in our
system.11
Some journalists make similar claims. In
her book on the corruption of American pol-
itics, Elizabeth Drew writes that the “danger-
ously low” trust in government has been
caused in large part by “the enormous and
ever-growing role of money in our political
campaigns—with corruption now outpacing
even that of the Nixon era.”12 She offers little
in the way of actual evidence for such a
claim.13
In all, reformers are quite confident that
campaign finance is a major cause of the
public’s distaste for politics.14 It turns out
that those claims are overblown. Yes, citizens’
trust in government is low,15 and, yes, cam-
paign spending has been increasing at a rapid
clip. However, if we examine the time-series
relationship between trust in government
and overall spending shown in Figure 1, no
relationship exists.
Before drawing any final conclusions, let’s
be precise about what the would-be reform-
ers are claiming. They believe that increases
in campaign spending have caused declining
trust in government. To be the cause of
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declining trust, campaign spending must
exhibit temporal precedence (precede its effect),
and there must be concomitant covariation
between (concurrent changes in) campaign
spending and trust. If the reformers are cor-
rect, trust in government should go down as
campaign spending goes up. Statistically, the
advocates of new regulations are asserting
that an inverse correlation between cam-
paign spending and trust in government
exists; such correlations are measured on a
scale of +1 to –1. If the reformers were com-
pletely correct, we would find a strong
inverse correlation between spending and
trust, indicated by a –1.0 coefficient of corre-
lation. Anything more (i.e., anything closer to
zero) than  –1.0 is a weaker relationship. A
moderate to strong negative relationship
would be between –.6 and -.4.
Public opinion data show that citizens’
trust in government dropped dramatically in
the 1960s and early 1970s and then followed
a somewhat varied path (Figure 1). Spending
has been increasing steadily since data began
being collected systematically after the cre-
ation of the Federal Election Commission.16
These data show in two ways that rising cam-
paign spending was not the cause of public
mistrust of government. 
First, the major drop in citizen trust took
place before the run-up in spending. The lat-
ter could not have been the cause of growing
mistrust of government. The claims by
McCain and others fail the temporal prece-
dence test.
Second, the evidence shows only a minute
relationship between trust and campaign
spending. Since the early 1980s, citizen mis-
trust of government has risen and fallen, so
we cannot say that, overall, mistrust has
increased in the last two decades.17 That indi-
cates that rising campaign spending has not
been associated with rising mistrust of gov-
ernment. In fact, a simple calculation of the
correlation between spending in congres-
sional races (adjusted for inflation to 1998
dollars) and trust in government puts the
correlation at -.027. The relationship in sta-
tistical terms is very close to zero.
Cynicism about politics is clearly rooted
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Figure 1
Trust in Government and Campaign Spending
Sources: For trust, National Election Studies database of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, 1964–98,
http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide/toptable/tab5a1.htm; for congressional campaign spending, Federal
Election Commission press releases.
in something far deeper than campaign con-
tributions. A passing glance at Figure 1 indi-
cates that public trust fell steadily between
1964 and 1980, a period that included the
Vietnam War, Watergate, and the economic
mistakes of the Carter years. That period also
provided other clear examples of corruption,
deceit, incompetence, and chicanery. The
public responded to actual events, not some
general sense that democracy had faltered. In
any case, Senator McCain’s assertion that
campaign finance has driven mistrust of
American politics over the past three decades
is simply false. 
If the data presented thus far are not con-
vincing, consider a cross-sectional analysis of
the answers to two questions from a 1997
survey commissioned by the Center for
Responsive Politics, a nonpartisan group
that examines the role of money in politics
and has a bent toward additional campaign
finance regulation.18 When asked if they were
satisfied with the political process, 59 percent
of respondents said that they were not. Of
those, only 14 percent said that the reason
for their dissatisfaction was the perception
that politicians are corrupt or that special
interests “buy” outcomes. This suggests that
less than 10 percent of the polled population
directly linked their overall view of the system
with money in politics.19
What about another link, between media
coverage of campaign finance and the level of
citizen trust? In the 1997 CRP survey cited
above, 60 percent of Americans who heard at
least some information about questionable
fundraising were dissatisfied with the politi-
cal process, compared with only 45 percent of
those who had heard little or nothing, a sta-
tistically significant difference. At the very
least, this relationship is more plausible. The
media’s fascination with money has grown in
recent years, and the media’s ability to help
define what is important for the public is
well-known. The real link between public
opinion and campaign finance, then, may lie
with the mass media’s emphasis on cam-
paign finance, rather than any significant
concern on the public’s part.
Does the Public Care
about Campaign Finance
Regulation?
That reformers are wrong about cam-
paign finance and public trust does not
mean that the public rejects changes in the
law. Most polls show that the public desires
changes to a “broken” system. Some polls
even show significant support for limiting
campaign expenditures, a clear violation of
the First Amendment to the Constitution. If
the public is so supportive of new regula-
tions, why have McCain-Feingold and other
proposals failed to become law?
One hypothesis that receives mixed sup-
port is that the public does not believe that
reforms will change anything in Washington.
In the 1997 CRP poll, 62 percent of respon-
dents felt that laws could be effective in
reducing the role of money in politics, but in
a 2000 Gallup poll, 64 percent felt that
changing campaign finance laws would do
nothing to reduce the “power of special inter-
ests.”20 Those answers were, to a large degree,
influenced by question wording, question
placement, and other survey-design issues.
A more plausible hypothesis is that, out-
side the Beltway, the public does not care
about the issue. Consider the data. When
asked by the CRP if reform should be a top or
high priority, most Americans (60 percent)
answered in the affirmative. Yet they also
agreed that a series of other policy areas was
more important.21 This suggests that cam-
paign finance is a priority only after more
important (i.e., higher-priority) issues have
been addressed. In fact, in poll after poll,
campaign finance is near the bottom of the
list of important issues alongside world
peace and homelessness.22 
Predictably, some advocates of restric-
tions on campaign finance disagree. For
example, Elizabeth Drew argues:
Reform of our campaign finance sys-
tem to get at the worst, most corro-
sive problem in our political system
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isn’t a lost cause. The argument that
“people don’t care” doesn’t stand up
to scrutiny; it’s a convenient ruse
used by opponents of reform. Public
support for campaign money reform
has been growing. Again and again,
polls show that when asked about it
directly, they are strongly in favor of
it, even if they do not list it as one of
their top priorities. In a survey con-
ducted in August 1998, voters in
eight states were asked if they pre-
ferred major changes, minor
changes, or no changes in the cam-
paign finance system. In all eight
states, including New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, and even Mississippi
(home of Trent Lott), pluralities
called for changes. Majorities did so
in New Hampshire and Indiana.23
Unfortunately, Drew does not provide
citations for her specific claims about the
eight states. Drew’s statement implies, how-
ever, that in six of eight states less than a
majority called for changes. Those numbers
are low, and one wonders how they help her
argument. She states in this paragraph that
(1) the public views campaign money reform
as a low priority (they “do not list it as one of
their top priorities”) and (2) that fewer than a
majority in the surveys she studied favor
reform. She then uses those facts to assert
that opponents of reform are pulling the
wool over the public’s eyes by claiming that
the public does not care about reform.
Perhaps it depends on how one defines
“care.” 
Why should policymakers care about the
way citizens rank policy priorities? Policy-
makers should care about how they allocate
their time and efforts on behalf of their con-
stituents. The legislative agenda has limited
space; giving some issues attention and time
inevitably excludes other issues. Given this
reality, the priority accorded an issue by citi-
zens is important, since it tells policymakers
whether an issue should take up valuable and
scarce time on the legislative agenda. The atti-
tude of the public on campaign finance
reform generally seems to be, “Sure, we sup-
port changing campaign finance laws, but
only once you’ve taken care of the big issues.”
In the current context, this suggests that the
legislative priorities of the new administration
should come before consideration of new
campaign finance regulations.
Conclusion
Americans argue about campaign finance in
many ways. The Constitution and the First
Amendment matter a great deal to these argu-
ments,24 and, of course, in a democracy the
wishes of the public often inform policymak-
ing. Supporters of McCain-Feingold and other
efforts to enact new restrictions on campaign
finance believe the public cares deeply about
such changes. They also argue that increased
campaign spending has made the public cyni-
cal about and mistrusting of politics.
Supporters of McCain-Feingold are
wrong on both counts. The public does not
care much about new campaign finance
restrictions. The evidence clearly shows that
increased campaign spending has not caused
public mistrust of government.
Campaign finance arouses great passions
among elites, but the public at large is not all
that interested in the details of campaign
finance legislation. The facts about public
opinion presented here lead inexorably to
this conclusion: On the issue of campaign
finance, the public appears to be engaging in
a collective yawn. Congress should take the
hint and spend its time and resources on
issues of greater public concern.25
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